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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-The Ocean of the Air Revisited
In the embryonic stage of air travel there was uncertainty as
to what body of law should control its development. The theory
arose that the air surrounding the earth was an ocean in itself and
therefore properly the subject of maritime jurisdiction.' This
theory was never generally accepted, and as early as 1921 Judge
Cardozo, analyzing the characteristics of a hydroaeroplane,2 deter-
mined that although it qualified as maritime while afloat "a hydro-
aeroplane, while in the air, is not subject to the admiralty . . .
because it is not then in navigable waters, and navigability is the
test of admiralty jurisdiction."' Other courts followed suit by hold-
ing that an "amphibian plane' 4 and "overseas transport flying
boat"' were not "vessels" 6 within the purview of admiralty juris-
diction. As a result of such consensus of opinion, the commerce
clause of the Constitution, not maritime law,7 became the basis for
federal legislation involving air travel.8
This theory was revised in the recent case of Notarian v. Trans
World Airlines.' The plaintiff, Mrs. Notarian, ° was a passenger
on a direct transoceanic flight from Rome, Italy, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. She was returning to her seat from the rest-room
when the airplane was "jolted violently,"'" and personal injury re-
'Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 91-92 n.23 (N.D. Cal.
1954).
2 Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Serv. Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371
(1921).8Id. at 118, 133 N.E. at 372.
'Dollins v. Pan-Am. Grace Airways, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
"Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 1939 Am. Mar. Cas. 1048 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
"'Transactions are maritime only when connected with a 'vessel.'"
RoDixsoN, ADmIRALTY § 8 (1939).
Admiralty jurisdiction was opposed on the rationale that "aerial naviga-
tion is more akin to transportation on the earth's surface than it is to sea
travel . . . ." Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 271, 304
(1921).
'The Air Commerce Act, 44 Stat. 568-76 (1926), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 176 (1964).
:244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
'
0 Her husband was also a plaintiff.
"1 244 F. Supp. at 875.
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sulted. The aircraft was unaffected by the disturbance and con-
tinued to its destination. The suit for failure to provide a "reason-
ably safe passage"' 2 was brought in admiralty, although there was
no physical contact between the airplane and the ocean.
The defendant acknowledged numerous maritime cases involv-
ing aircraft 3 but contended that contact with the water is essential
for admiralty jurisdiction. The court referred to the "ocean of the
air theory" and the fact that the Death on the High Seas Act,14 a
maritime law, has been applied to air travel where no contact with
the water was present. 5 Relying on D'Aleman v. Pan Ant. World
Airlines'6 it said :.
[I]t has been held that the Death on the High Seas Act grants a
right of action in admiralty for death caused by wrongful act,
neglect or default occurring in the air space over the high
seas .... [W]hether a plane comes in actual physical contact
with the sea does not matter. What does matter is that the
cause of action occurs over the sea."
Holding that admiralty jurisdiction was properly invoked, the
court declared that the question of necessity for contact with the
water has never been settled and admiralty has a long history of
altering its boundaries when necessity and progress demand.
Assuming that the expansion of admiralty jurisdiction autho-
rized in Notarian would be generally received, what are the conse-
quences to personal injury claimants such as Mrs. Notarian?
At present suits of this nature are usually governed by the War-
saw Convention.' A significant element of this international agree-
'- Ibid.13R.g., Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958)
(plaintiff's decedent died in a crash in the Pacific Ocean); Noel v. Linea
Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907
(1957) (death resulting from a crash off the New Jersey coast). The
defendant in Notarian contended that the case came within the purview of
the Warsaw Convention, but the court held that this was insufficiently
pleaded and not to be considered. For the significance of this determination
see notes 18-21 infra and the accompanying text.
1' 41 Stat. 537-38 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1964). The act provides
for suit in the district courts, in admiralty, when death occurs "on the
high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the
District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United
States." 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964).
" Choy v. Pan-Am. Airways Co., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y.
1941).1 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1958).
17244 F. Supp. at 877.
IS Warsaw Convention, July 31, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876. See
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ment is the limitation on the amount of recovery in personal injury
claims to 125,000 French francs.'9 This is the equivalent of 8,300
dollars.2 In jurisdictions where tort recoveries are often generous,
an injured plaintiff may find that the limitation makes his compen-
sation considerably less than it would be if the same injury had been
sustained in another mode of transportation. In fact, the severity
of this limitation has resulted in the proposed rejection of the con-
vention by the United States as of May, '1966, if the maximum
recoverable amount is not raised.2
An aspect of admiralty law that is clearly not appropriate in
cases of personal injury or death to airplane passengers while flying
over the high seas is the right of a shipowner to the benefits of the
Limitation of Liability Act.2 Under that act the liability of the
owner of a vessel for any loss that was occasioned without his
privity or knowledge" is limited to the value of his interest in the
vessel and pending freight with the further proviso that in cases
of personal injury or death the limitation fund shall in no event be
less than sixty dollars per ton of the vessel's gross tonnage. Ton-
nage for admiralty purposes refers to the internal space of a vessel,
not its weight. An admiralty ton is one hundred cubic feet of
space 24
Considering the relatively small internal capacity of a passenger
aircraft, the inequity of applying the above criteria for limitation
of liability to air travel is obvious.2 5 It can be argued that the possi-
bility of such application was never contemplated by Congress and
U.S. CivIL AERONAUTICS BD., AERONAUTICAL STATUTES AND RELATED MA-
TERIAL 290-331 (rev. ed. 1959). The convention is an international agree-
ment regulating air travel between the participating nations. The original
convention was held October 12, 1929.
"Warsaw Convention, art. 22(1).
"Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. KLM v. Tuller, 292 F.2d
775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
"Time, Oct. 29, 1965, p. 98. The United States proposal for elevating
the limitation is for an immediate raise to $75,000 with an ultimate ceiling
of $100,000.
229 Stat. 635 (1851), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1964).
"There is much litigation involving the interpretation to be placed on
the words "privity or knowledge." See Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406,
410 (1943); and 3 BENEDICT, AD-mRALTY §§ 489-90 (6th ed. 1940).
" Inman S.S. Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 243 (1876).
" The manner of ascertainment of the internal capacity in tons is equally
foreign to aircraft. It is couched in such nautical terms as "the inside of
the plank on the stem timbers . . . the rake of the bow in the thickness of
the deck ... the rake of the stern timber in one-third of the round of the
beam. ... REv. STAT. 99 41-53 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 77 (1964).
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therefore the attempt should not be made. If this assumption is
valid, it can be further contended that the present dissatisfaction
with the personal injury limitation of the Warsaw Convention is
evidence that nothing short of the 100,000-dollar permanent limita-
tion, proposed by the United States as an amendment to the Conven-
tion, should be placed on recovery. It is submitted that the original
purpose of the limitation in admiralty-to encourage the expansion
of commerce and trade-is no longer a practical consideration in
personal injury suits. Commerce and trade have long since reached
an economic level that no amount of personal injury recovery is
likely to discourage.
Given the difficulty of fitting the airplane into this phase of
maritime law, there are aspects of admiralty that could be applied
with ease and benefit to the plaintiff.2 6 For example, the relevance
of contributory" and comparative negligence' doctrines could be
a significant tactical consideration for the personal injury claimant
suing in admiralty. Under the Warsaw Convention, contributory
negligence may be a complete bar to recovery.2" In admiralty, the
doctrine of comparative negligence prevails.8" The fault of the
plaintiff may be used to mitigate damages but not to defeat the
claim entirely.
The prerequisites to federal jurisdiction could be a monumental
reason for bringing suit in admiralty. A trial in federal court,
absent a federal question,8 ' requires that the claimant show diversity
of citizenship and meet the 10,000-dollar amount-in-controversy
26 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1964) has already brought aircraft into maritime
jurisdiction for criminal purposes. It deals with crimes committed over
the high seas and provides:
The term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States," as used in this title, includes: ....
(5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United
States, or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or
under the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, district,
or possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight over the high
seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty and maritimejurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any
particular State.
"For a discussion of contributory negligence see PROSSER, TORTS § 64,
at 426-37 (3d ed. 1964).For a discussion of comparative negligence see id. § 66, at 443-49.
29 Warsaw Convention, art. 21.
'0 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
128 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1964) provides that "the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in contro-
versy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs,
and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
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requirement.32 In an admiralty suit, the federal court has jurisdic-
tion in "any civil case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"3 " re-
gardless of diversity or amount in controversy.
A possible disadvantage to exclusive admiralty jurisdiction is
that the case will be tried by judge without jury.' But if the claim-
ant desires a jury trial and is able to meet the requirements pre-
viously mentioned for suit in a federal court, the language of the
"saving clause"3 may afford the opportunity. This exception to
maritime jurisdiction preserves a common-law cause of action,
where one exists, to the plaintiff with an in personam 6 claim. It
allows the suit to be brought on the law side of the federal court
(a state court proceeding is also available) with a jury trial even
though the case arises in a maritime context. If this choice is made
the plaintiff must be prepared to meet the diversity and amount-in-
controversy requirements. It was urged by the plaintiff in Romero
v. International Terminal Operating Co.37 that a suit founded in
admiralty, if the claimant chooses the law side of the federal court
by way of the "saving clause," does not require diversity of citizen-
ship as the claim arises under the Constitution and laws of the
United States. Plaintiff, an alien seaman, had a basis for his con-
tention because admiralty jurisdiction is authorized by the Constitu-
tion38 and codified.39 But in a five-to-four decision the Court re-
jected this interpretation. The dissent, led by Justice Brennan,
8228 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964).
828 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
" RoBINsoN, op, cit. supra note 6, § 1, at 2. It is interesting to note that
not all attorneys consider a jury trial advantageous in litigation involving
aircraft. At the Twenty-first Annual Law Institute of the University of
Tennessee College of Law and the Knoxville Bar Association, Mr. Lee S.
Kreindler, member of the New York Bar, expressed a definite preference
for judge trials. Referring to recent cases in which he was counsel for the
plaintiffs in suits against air lines, he said that it was the defendant air
lines that requested a jury. This was explained in part by the inability of
many jurors to identify with air line passengers as many have yet to fly
and still think that one who "is fool enough to set foot on an airplane is
assuming a very, very serious risk." Trial Tactics in Aviation Litigation,
28 TENN. L. REv. 173, 181-82 (1961).
88 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964). It is so designated because it preserves a
common-law cause of action for the plaintiff who qualifies and operates as
an escape valve from the exclusive maritime jurisdiction.
" A claim against the owner of the vessel as opposed to an in rem pro-
ceeding against the vessel itself. A suit to attach a lien on the vessel would
be an example of the latter.
8' 358 U.S. 354 (1959). For a full discussion of the case see BAER,
ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT § 1-13, at 62-69 (1963).8 U.S. CoNsT. art III, § 2.
8° 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1964).
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agreed with the plaintiff that no diversity should be required.
It has been suggested that an acceptance of the minority posi-
tion would be desirous "because there is little logic in a system
of law which affords a seaman suing on a maritime cause of action
a federal jury trial if there happens to be diversity of citizenship
but which denies him a jury in the same federal court if there is
no diversity."4 If this rationale were adopted, it would apply to
passenger claimants as well as seamen and be an additional induce-
ment to seeking maritime jurisdiction.41
The advantages, disadvantages, and problems evidenced in the
previous discussion must be considered in the light of possible de-
parture of the Warsaw Convention from the transoceanic flight
scene in the United States.4" If these rules disappear, admiralty is
a logical replacement.
Some aspects of admiralty, like the tonnage provision,43 would
be difficult to employ. It is submitted that a selective process would
be in order, a new set of rules governing transoceanic air travel
using the basic concepts of admiralty as a foundation with liberal
provision for adjustment to the rapid developments that character-
ize modem aviation.
WILLIAm H. FAULK, JR.
Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punisbment-
Chronic Alcoholism
In Driver v. Hinnant' defendant had been found guilty and sen-
tenced' to imprisonment for two years for violation of a North
Carolina statute making it a misdemeanor for "any person ... [to]
be found drunk or intoxicated on the public highway, or at any
public place or meeting . . ... - Defendant had been convicted of
,
0 BAER, op. cit. supra note 37, at 69.
"The problem does not arise if the state forum is chosen. But if contrib-
utory negligence is an issue, it may nullify any prospective advantage ofjury trial. In Notarian, contributory negligence was not an issue but this
writer is informed that a three- or four-year backlog in the Pennsylvania
courts played a significant role in the decision to sue in admiralty. Letter
from plaintiff's attorney to the writer, Jan. 31, 1966.
"2 See text accompanying note- 21 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 22 supra.
'Driver v. Hinnant, 34 U.S.L. Week 2422 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 1966).
2Driver v. Hirmant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1953).
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